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Contours of Regional Identity: Testing Constructivism on Kaliningrad’s
Ground
Andrey S. Makarychev
The Kaliningrad Oblast (KO) is perhaps the best known worldwide and most extensively covered region of the Russian Federation. However, many analysts are still frustrated by multiple uncertainties surrounding KO’s geopolitical position in Europe and its uniqueness in this region, which leaves the problem of understanding the developments of this peculiar Russian province still open to debate. The first problem is that most of the scholarship on KO can be grouped into two separate but loosely connected categories. One group of scholars basically deals with the region’s domestic political processes – elections, elite changes, relations with the federal center, and so forth. The second group looks at KO mainly from an international relations lens, discussing its roles in European and/or Baltic Sea integration. Each of these two dominant approaches – one developed primarily by political scientists, and the second one by international relations scholars – has achieved much, yet neither of them fully reflects or represents the whole spectrum of political relations in which KO is partaking. Hence, there is a need for integrated research combining both domestic and international dimensions of KO regionalism, and bridging the gap between the two autonomous research field being formed nowadays. The second problem is one of interpreting and conceptualizing the KO developments, and incorporating this region into wider theoretical debates that are going on in Europe and worldwide. KO is a good case study for tracing different paradigms of regionalism, each one having its own conceptual underpinnings. Of course, it is not that easy to relate specific international relations theories to these paradigms. This linkage, of course is not always evident, and I can only identify some relationships (at times weak ones) between theoretical positions and orientations, on the one hand, and political practices concerning KO, on the other. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, I reconstruct and depict a specific understanding of regionalism in KO as seen from an identity perspective. Secondly, I explain the identity issue as related to KO through the lens of the region’s domestic politics, thus bridging the gap between domestic and international developments. Of course, as a theory, constructivism is mainly rooted in international political economy discourse, yet one of my tasks is to discover its intrinsic determinants. 1. Kaliningrad Oblast at the Intersection of Northern and Baltic Europe The theory of constructivism has many supporters in both academic and policy-making circles in the countries surrounding KO. Conceptually, the constructivist way of thinking relies upon rich traditions of peace research and different post-positivist interpretations of politics and society. Constructivist conceptions postulate that “all spaces (regions, states, localities, networks, etc.) are both discursive and material constructions” (1). Constructivist logic assumes that there is a great amount of “empty political space” to fill out after the demise of Communism. Kaliningrad could have been treated as one of these “empty spaces” prone to incorporation into neighboring surroundings. KO fits well into what might be called “adjacent areas of the Nordic region” (2), but this conclusion is open to varied interpretations. The political space of “Eastern Europe,” being the legacy of the Cold War, has almost disappeared as one of formerly basic markers of European geopolitical system. Yet the countries and regions of what was formerly called “Eastern Europe” have had to find new identifications and new niches. Connecting some of former “Eastern Europe” areas to the “northern horizontal” is one of the most widely debated options. In this case the “northerness” becomes a mediator of different historical and cultural worlds, a pole of attraction of resources and initiatives. The creation of a Euro-region named “Baltica” (with KO included and Russian recognized as one of two official languages) is one attempt to “multilaterize” the regional agenda in this part of Europe and find positive linkages between what formerly used to be “Eastern Europe” and what might become the “Northern region” in the future. Ola Tunander assumes that “the Nordic area is extended eastwards and its center is shifting from its West Nordic to its East Nordic and Baltic Sea area” (3). As a result, Nordic and Baltic regions open up new channels of dialogue with EU non-members, which is a high priority task for Brussels (4). Major regionalist initiatives are based on inclusive, rather than exclusive principles. At the same time, Russia is granted the status of being “one of us,” as a potential partner which might feel comfortable with both Baltic and Nordic initiatives (5). The “Northern Dimension” region building project, advocated by Finland, fits quite well into constructivist logic. “A small and relatively peripheral country appears to have grasped the initiative” of doing away with the old opposition between “East” and “West” as the core signifiers within Europe (6). This is a rare example of a newcomer’s passionate drive aimed at constructing new political coordinates that suit the country, and finding out a new political identity in rapidly changing circumstances. The Northern Dimension was born out of the 1997 Finnish debates on Europe. After the fall of the Berlin wall, Finland was not eager to associate itself with Eastern Europe as this geographic area has become too uncertain and had, for the most part, lost its political identity in 1990s. Further, Finland did not want to accept the indisputable hegemony of the EU (7). One of the explanations of Finland’s leadership in promoting the Nordic agenda is that “Finns became more used to appeasing greater powers than their Scandinavian brothers” (8). Yet the debates about new “coordinates” in Europe are ongoing. It is quite telling, for example, that significant parts of political elite in Estonia and Lithuania prefer to treat their countries as belonging to “Central Europe” rather than to the “Baltic region” (9). Estonia, by the same token, occasionally characterizes itself as a “Nordic country” as well (10). On the contrary, the Northern Dimension topic keeps a low profile in the Danish political discourse on Europe. Hence, Baltic and Nordic Europe are not yet wellestablished entities. Both are still in search for their social and intellectual identities and political relevance. What differentiates the Baltic Sea region from Nordic Europe is still debatable: catchwords, including “organizing principles” (11) and promising regionsin- the-making, are uncertainly bounced around. The Northern Dimension could be interpreted as an initiative within the existing framework of Baltic Sea cooperation, or as an attempt to integrate the Russian regions bordering the Baltic Sea into existing trans-national frameworks, or as a tool for fostering the pre-accession process of the EU applicants (12). All these conflicting interpretations could easily be found in multiple political and academic discourses. In Pertti Joenniemi’s opinion, region-building projects in the Baltic and Nordic Europe are at odds with endeavors to maintain a rather centralized and hierarchic European Union. Culturally, there was always a sort of opposition of European and Nordic civilizations shaping political debates in Scandinavian countries. Brussels, as a political incarnation of the “Fortress Europe,” is perceived by many in Europe as a “soft imperial center” (13). Others employ tougher language – like “neo-medieval” or “neo- Sumerian” empire ostensibly displaying geopolitical expansionism in its own ‘near abroad” zones (like Baltic and Mediterranean regions) (14). Yet the same is true as well with regard to Baltic and Nordic opposition to Russia, the country that is often perceived as hierarchical, centralized and even a menacing power. Baltic/Nordic region building efforts challenge the centralizers and make Europe more multilayered, pluralistic, less coherent and less centrally controlled. If the Russian Federation (and to a lesser extent the European Union) is formed in the “top down” way, then the Nordic and Baltic regions are of “bottom up” background (13). It appears that KO exists in two political spaces simultaneously, being a part of both Nordic and Baltic Europe. The great advantage for the Kaliningrad Oblast is that the Baltic and Nordic region building projects are not predefined by somebody in Western Europe or elsewhere, and thus leave spacious room for individual initiatives. In Pertti Joenniemi’s words, the concept of regional integration “has been coined in a number of scholarly texts and appeared in various political speeches”. In fact, it has started as a “semiotic project” (14) with “re-reading history, cultural studies, and redirecting communication flows… The very first step has been a series of conferences, think tanks reports, and articles in more or less scientific journals. The first steps have been taken by intellectuals, to some extent the cultural elite” (15). Think tanks, epistemological communities and other “cognitive actors” thus play major roles in shaping and designing the region-building initiatives and making them a part of wider public debates (16). Neither Baltic nor Nordic Europe has a single ‘founding father;’ they rather are made of an exchange of views, with a broad variety of voices (17). There is nothing akin to “intellectual hegemony” (18) in this constructivist exercise of regionalism, since all voices are different. Some argue, for example, that “after Denmark, Sweden and Finland have all become parts of the integration process of continental Europe, the motive for safeguarding a separate Nordic model of organizing the economy and society has been under pressure and even questioned” (19). As Uffe Ostergard puts it, “there are no objective laws binding the people of Norden together in a common destiny. But there is a historical and cultural raw material on which such an identity may be built” (20). The lesson for Russia is that it has to stop perceiving Europe as a single and unified civilizational block. Otherwise Europe would be what the EU defines it to be, and Russia might face the challenge of exclusion from the European political, economic and social spaces. Russia has a unique chance of organically participating in the region-building effort that opens up opportunities that transverse traditional “East-West” lines making them less divisive (21). The mission of the Kaliningrad Oblast, in full consent with constructivist logic, might be to prevent “the wall-like borders between the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’ through the Schengen system” to be established (22). It is critically important that the Baltic Sea and Nordic regions are being formed without any overall plan or superior authority, and even with no strict criteria for membership (23), which might make Russia’s voice stronger in decision making procedures. Such issues as regional identity, and even regional security, are socially and politically constructed phenomena in this area (24). Thus, by participating in international region-building projects, the Kaliningrad Oblast might contribute to elevating regionality into a core principle of constructing political space in this part of Europe. Also, it has to profit from the fact that there is a Northern and a Baltic way to deal with Europe. At the same time, Russia has to perceive the Northern Dimension and the Baltic Sea region as an opportunity to join the “democratic space” where the main priorities are human rights, minorities protection, and healthy environment (25). One might agree that “Kaliningrad is more exposed to foreign influences than other Russian regions,” and that “Europe has a tremendous cultural influence on the region” (26). Yet finding Kaliningrad’s place in the Nordic and Baltic regions is not that easy. Unlike other territorial actors in this part of Europe, KO lacks strong regional identity, which in a sense weakens its integrative drive and overall cooperative potential. This partly explains the lack of indigenous initiatives and innovations aimed at joining the Baltic and Nordic “concerts,” and heavy reliance upon both Moscow and Brussels. From the very beginning, KO was an artificial territorial unit, a Soviet trophy of the Second World War. It has to break away its historical and cultural affiliations due to geopolitical and security considerations. KO’s initial purpose – the military outpost of the Soviet Union – has lost its former relevance. Most experts think that Kaliningrad is of little strategic and military value. In Alexander Sergounin’s words, “the military significance of Kaliningrad has dramatically declined in the 1990s… Many military analysts doubt that Kaliningrad is really defensible from a strategic point of view because of its remoteness and low fighting efficiency” (27). The search for new, non-military roles proves to be extremely hard and time-consuming. However, it is doubtful unfortunately that “all regional players are very serious about solving the Kaliningrad problem” (28) as inaction and passive resistance to further KO internationalization are still major obstacles for the region’s integration to Baltic and Nordic Europe. The situation gets more complicated for KO when examining the oblast’s future through the lenses of a number of dualities and dilemmas. Indeed, KO finds itself:
Being a part of a number of region-building initiatives, the Kaliningrad Oblast finds itself in a very innovative yet still uncertain intellectual and political environment. Narratives of Kaliningrad are very subjective, and not much in this “cognitive space” (32) is self-evident. Yet Russia’s enclave has not only to live up to this uncertainty, but also find the ways to reshape the Baltic “cognitive space” for her own sake and readjust it to her own interests. 2. Constructivist metaphors In a sense, a region is not only geographic, but is a mental and cultural unit as well, and all participating parties must be willing to impose their meanings on an emerging regional constellation. Different political forces try to represent the situation in Kaliningrad differently, keeping an eye on their own interests. In this sense Kaliningrad’s regional discourses are very pluralistic and in a way “de-centralized.” This effectively heats up debates on regional issues and makes paramount the public relations dimension of region building. There is a great variety of “code words” in Kaliningrad discourses, which perform special functions – ones of “signifiers” and “markers” of regional identity. Most of these terms are far from being universally accepted, and are often debated and disputed amongst specialists. This varied terminology contains multiple cognitive metaphors that have to be interpreted and re-interpreted according to the topical and disciplinary context. As a result, the regionalist discourses are constructed around certain images of Kaliningrad’s future that might be open to multiple interpretations. Hence, there is an ample space for what is often called “imagination,” or creativity in approaching the whole spectrum of Kaliningrad-related matters. This again emphasizes the importance of scholarly communities that focus their intellectual capital on regional issues. It is worth noting that starting from 2001 the federal government of Russia has recognized the importance of positive information coverage of a wide-range of Kaliningrad-related matters. To make the federal information policy more coherent and favorable to Russia, the Minister of Press, Broadcasting, and Mass, Media Mikhail Lesin, Minister of Communication and Information, Leonid Reiman, and the head of the Information Department at the Presidential Administration, Sergey Yastrzhembskii visited Kaliningrad in April 2001. They have taken the first steps in what the journalists have called “advertising campaign” to promote positive image of Russia’s western enclave worldwide (33). It is understood that metaphors are parts of a search for a symbolic capital, which is an important part of a regional-building agenda in the Baltic Sea region. Russia has clearly displayed her interest in positive images of KO future. Here are the most widely disseminated metaphors that to a certain extent reflect Kaliningrad’s alternative futures:
Conclusion The constructivist interpretations of regional identity leave spacious room for integrated approaches to KO which are likely to emerge between those actors that speak similar political language. Yet at the same time, the gaps between parties involved are still there. Interpretative differences are stark. For example, in the traditional functional way, the Russian approach towards the Northern Dimension has focused mainly on the issue of the funds attached to the initiative, while the Finnish experts treat it basically as a platform allowing to express innovative forms of cooperation and meet the challenges related to the future institutional architecture of Europe. In other words, Northern Dimension might be interpreted either as a tool in the hands of dominating actors, or as a policy forum open to everybody wishing to participate (43). What was accomplished by now in trying to solve the “Kaliningrad puzzle” is only identifying the issues of major concern and creating a platform for discussion and negotiations. In this sense Kaliningrad is heading towards what could be called “the learning region” (44). Its record of success is still not too encouraging for the whole decade of 1990s, yet the process of studying and maturing is far from being over. Acknowledgements: The author wishes to acknowledge financial and institutional support provided by Sodertorns University College (Stockholm), Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, and International Policy Fellows Program of the Open Society Institute (Budapest). References
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